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Abstract—Security in wireless sensor networks is critical due
to its way of open communication. In this paper we have pro-
vided a solution to detect malicious nodes which perform radio
transmission power control attack and sinkhole attack in wireless
sensor networks. In the proposed approach, data transmission
is divided into multiple rounds of equal time duration. Each
node chooses the parent node in the beginning of the round for
forwarding the packet towards sink. Each node adds its identity
in the packet as a routing path marker and encrypts before
forwarding to parent. Child node observes the parent, handles
acknowledgement from 2-hop distance node and decides the trust
on parent based on successful and unsuccessful transactions.
Each node sends a trust value report via multiple paths to
Sink at the end of the round. Sink identifies the malicious node
by comparing trust value report received from each node with
number of data packets received. Simulated the algorithm in NS-3
and performance analysis compared with other recently proposed
approach. Simulation results show that proposed method detect
the malicious nodes efficiently and early.
Index Terms—WSN, trust based, malicious node, power control
attack, bad mouthing attack, sinkhole attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially
distributed autonomous devices having sensing, computing
and communication capabilities. Sensor nodes cooperatively
monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as tem-
perature, pressure, sound, vibration, motion or pollutants.
Wireless sensor networks are used in environmental conditions
where information is difficult to access. Sensor node, also
known as a ’mote’, is a node in a wireless sensor network that
is capable of performing some processing, gathering sensory
information and communicating with other connected nodes
in the network. Sensor network transmits the data from one
node to another node in an adhoc way and finally to a base
station where the data is stored, processed and displayed.
Sensor nodes are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [1].
Attacker can listen to radio transmissions, modify the packet
before forwarding, misroute the packet to unintended next hop
node, inject false data in the channel, replay previously heard
packets to drain the energy of other nodes as battery power
is crucial in nodes. Attacker may deploy few malicious nodes
with similar or better hardware capabilities or by ’turning’ few
legitimate nodes by capturing them and physically overwriting
their memory. Sybil attack - attacker deployed nodes may also
use the identities of the other genuine nodes to frame other
genuine nodes as malicious. Packet dropping, modification,
misrouting are basic problems which have large impact on
the information gathered by sensor nodes as network loses lot
of important sensed data. Cryptography techniques alone are
not sufficient to protect the data. Attacks such as colluding
collision[2], misrouting, power control, sinkhole, wormhole,
rushing attacks can be launched without the help of cryptog-
raphy keys [3].
If a node has the ability to control its power to transmit the
data, then it can vary the radio range of data transmission[4].
In Figure 1, if node Y has ability to control the power to vary
its data transmission distance, then node Y can use less power
such that only Z and other neighbor nodes hear the packet
forwarding from Y but X does not hear the packet forwarding
from Y as X is farther than any other node. Sender and other
neighbor nodes feel that Y has actually transmitted the packet
to X but intended recipient X missed to receive the packet.
If node Y is successful in achieving the power control attack
for all packets to be forwarded then the node Y resembles the
sinkhole attack without being detected from others. In sinkhole
attack[5] malicious node attracts the routing data by publishing
the shortest path to Sink and drops all the packets without
forwarding further to Sink. Power control attack is smart way
of achieving the sinkhole attack.
Fig. 1. Power Control Attack Description
In this paper, we propose a scheme ’Power Control At-
tack Detection (PCAD)’ to identify malicious nodes which
performs power control attack and sinkhole attack. In figure
1, node Z observes the next hop node Y to detect any sinkhole
attack, and expects an acknowledgement from 2-hop distance
node X to detect power control attack by 1-hop distance
node Y. X does not reply acknowledgement unless it receives
packet from Y. Node Z maintain the count of successful
and unsuccessful packet transmission from Y based on 2-hop
acknowledgement from X. Node Z sends the report to sink
S at the end of each round of operation using multiple paths
through all selected parents. Sink detects the malicious nodes
based on the received data packets and also received reports
from all nodes.
In order to detect the sinkhole attack ’Detection of Sinkhole
Attack(DSHA)[6]’ has been proposed recently in the literature.
DSHA first identifies the area of network where malicious
node exists and then tries to find the malicious node in the
identified area. we provide a simulated analysis comparing
the DSHA approach and our proposed approach. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows, section II discusses about
the related work, section III describes the network model
and problem statement, section IV presents the solution and
algorithm, section V provides the performance analysis and
results, and section VI concludes the work and discusses the
future challenges.
II. RELATED WORK
To mitigate the security attacks and improve the reliabil-
ity, multi-path routing [7], [8], [9], [10] approach has been
proposed, where multiple copies of the packet are forwarded
to Sink node along the different paths available. Neighbor
node observation or monitoring is another approach [11],
[12], [13], [14] used to find the malicious activity of the
current forwarding node. In monitoring approach, observer
nodes monitor the current sender and current receiver for
the packet being transmitted. Observers observe for various
malicious activities such as packet dropping, modification,
power control, sinkhole attacks. Monitoring methods require
observer nodes to buffer the packets which are forwarded to
next hop node and compare the packet forwarded by next hop
node with its buffered packet to find out packet modifications.
In [15] both observation based and trust based techniques are
used to detect the malicious nodes performing various attacks,
but the approach becomes inefficient with the introduction of
power control attack. In [2], [4] power control attack has been
considered but the approach needs to have observer nodes in
the common radio range of the current sender and receiver.
Energy consumption in both multipath routing and neigh-
borhood monitoring is not affordable for sensor networks.
In multipath routing, energy is consumed from nodes along
multiple path to Sink to transmit same copy of data. In
monitoring approach, many nodes observe each hop while a
packet being forwarded and energy of all the observer nodes
consumed. In [3], energy efficient sleep-wake approach along
with local monitoring method is used to detect malicious nodes
but cannot control the bad mouthing attack from observers and
also need enough number of observes to make this approach
feasible. In [5], an approach to detect the sinkhole attack
has been proposed based on the CPU usage, but the false
positive increases by detecting less utilized node as malicious.
Paper[6], proposes a sinkhole detection method based on
network flow information and routing pattern in the network
but has high false isolation of the genuine nodes.
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Network Model
We considered wireless sensor network with one Sink node
with all the sensor nodes are randomly distributed [16]. After
deployment, network initialization and routing path building
starts with Sink node. Sink node transmits the path distance in-
formation to one hop neighbors. One hop neighbors increment
the distance information and share with two hop neighbors and
continues till the last hop node. Each node selects a list of
parent nodes which have equal and shortest distance to Sink
node. Each node selects a parent node among the identified
parent nodes and sends parent selection information to Sink.
Sink establishes a routing tree rooted at Sink node based on
the information received from each node. Data transmission is
divided into rounds of equal time duration. Each node chooses
a different parent node in the beginning of a round or phase
among the selected parents based on the trust they have on
the parent.
Intermediate node prepares marker data containing node
identity, encrypts the marker data and adds to the packet before
forwarding the packet to parent node. Marker data added by
each node helps Sink to trace the nodes in the routing path
[16]. All the nodes transmit the sensed data towards Sink for
processing.
Fig. 2. Deployment and Topology
System Assumptions: PCAD assumes the network is static
and the links are bidirectional. PCAD assumes that pair wise
keys are shared between Sink and each network node before
deployment. Assumed no malicious activity during topology
creation. In PCAD each node knows the current (X,Y) location
and also the location of the neighbor nodes. Source nodes
are assumed to be genuine. Assumed that during network
initialization a node establishes pair wise keys with two hop
distance nodes.
B. Problem Definition
The goal of the PCAD is to detect the malicious nodes
which perform power control and sinkhole attacks. In figure
2, node Z transmits packet to Y to forward towards Sink and
node Y transmits packet to node X to forward towards Sink.
If node Z is a source node then following are the problems to
be detected. i) If node Y performs sinkhole attack, then node
Z does not hear any packet forwarding from node Y. ii) If
node Y performs power control attack, then node Z hears the
packet forwarding from node Y but node X does not receive
the packet to be forwarded towards Sink. iii) Node X does
not send the 2-hop acknowledgement even though received
the packet successfully from node Y, just to frame the node
Y as malicious. iv) In above three scenarios, either node Y is
malicious or node Z is malicious as both can perform attacks
and restrain from sending acknowledgement. Problem is to
detect malicious nodes among such pair of nodes <X,Y>.
IV. PCAD
PCAD has two modules to detect the malicious nodes
perform power control attack and sinkhole attack. Module
installed in individual sensor nodes observe the parent, receive
two hop acknowledgment and build trust value on parent.
Module installed in Sink node maintain the count of packets
received on each path and compare with report sent by each
sensor node.
A. Sensor Node Module
Figure 3, shows the success case of packet transmission.
As a path marker, current sender Z adds the encrypted id
to the received packet P from previous hop and forwards
the packet A to next one hop node Y on the routing path.
One hop node Y prepares packet B by adding the encrypted
id and transmits the packet to X. Node Z also hears the
packet transmitted from Y and compares with its buffer and
waits for the acknowledgement from X. Node Z clears the
buffer and confirms the successful transmission on receiving
the acknowledgement. Acknowledgment C is encrypted with
the shared key between X and Z to avoid the fabrication and
modification of acknowledgement by Y.
Fig. 3. Successful transmission of Packet
Figure 4, shows the power control attack from one hop
forwarding node, where one hop node Y uses power such
that only current sender Z hears the packet but two hop node
X does not receive the packet. Node Z does not receive the
acknowledgment from two hop node X and after the timeout
node Z determines the power control attack from one hop node
Y and reduces the trust value on Y.
Fig. 4. Power control attack from one hop node
Figure 5, shows the sinkhole attack from one hop node Y.
Node Z does not hear the packet transmission from Y even
after the timeout period. Node Z determines the sinkhole attack
from one hop node Y and reduces the trust value on Y.
Fig. 5. Sinkhole attack from one hop node
Figure 6, shows that one hop node Y does not receive the
acknowledgement from two hop node X, then Y reduces the
trust value on X. And Z does not receive the acknowledgment
from Y and reduces the trust value on Y.
Fig. 6. No acknowledgment from two hop node
Each sensor node builds the trust value based on successful
or unsuccessful transactions with parent node and sends the
trust value report on parent to Sink node using all the selected
parents in forwarding path to Sink.
B. Sink Node Module
Sink starts processing the packet on receive to update the
count of the packet a node has participated either in forwarding
or generating. The received packet at Sink consists of sequence
of encrypted node ids which are path markers added by each
forwarding node and also sensed data from source node. Sink
starts the decryption process with below steps.
i) First marker information of message m is decrypted with





starts with < X > then X is the forwarded node. Else Sink
decrypts with key of next immediate first level child node and
tries to match the marker information.
ii) If marker information does not match with any of the
first level children, then Sink decrypts the complete message





with < X, D > then X is the source node. Else Sink decrypts
with key of next first level child node and tries to check for
source node.







- < X > by removing the marker added by
X and packet count of node X is incremented by one. Now
the step i and step ii are performed for all children of X to
match for forwarding node or source node.
Notations:
m: received packet at Sink
U, V, S: node id
pcountv: packet count maintained by Sink for node V
Vkey: shared key between Sink and node V
Algorithm 1: packet count update for each node
1: Input: Packet <m>
2: U = S, m = m; success = false;
3: for each child node V of node U do
4: P = decMarker(Vkey , m); /*decrypts only marker which
is two units*/
5: if P starts with <V> then
6: pcountv++;
7: trim <V> from P and get m = P-<V>;
8: U = V; endfor;
9: endfor;
10: for each child node V of node U do
11: P = decSourceMsg(Vkey , m); /*decrypts source
message which is two units*/
12: if P starts with <V, D> then /*V is the source node*/
13: pcountv++;
14: endfor;
the packet count recorded by Sink while processing the
packet will help Sink to determine the malicious node when
Sink receives the report from each node.
C. Malicious Node Detection from Sink
Each node prepares report containing a tuple <V, Vc, Pv ,
T> where V is node id, Vc is count of the packets node V
has forwarded and generated, Pv is the parent in the current
round of operation, T is the trust value on parent. Copies of the
report is sent to Sink node through all the parent nodes selected
during initialization of network. Multiple copies are sent to
make sure atleast one copy of the report reaches Sink node in
the presence of malicious nodes which perform the sinkhole
attack. Sink considers one copy even though it receives more
than one copy of the same report.
Notations:
R: vector of reports collected from each node
Rv: report sent by node V
Rv[T]: trust value in the record sent by node V
U, V: node id
Upacketcount: sum of packet counts from all children of U
Ut: sum of the trust value from all children U
Uavgt: average trust value of U
Uchildren: total number of children of U
dropthreshold: dropping threshold due to environmental
errors
Upcount: packet count maintained by Sink for node U
Vc: count of packets node V has sent in record
Tthreshold: trust threshold
Algorithm 2: malicious node detection at Sink
1: for each node U do
2: Upacketcount = 0;
3: Uavgt = 0;
4: for each child V of U do
5: Rv = R[V];
6: Upacketcount = Upacketcount + Rv[Vc];
7: Ut = Ut + Rv[T];
8: endfor;
9: Uavgt = Ut / Uchildren;
10: if (Upacketcount - Upcount > dropthreshold) then
11: if (Uavgt < Tthreshold) then
12: mark node U as malicious;
13:endfor;
Sink receives the report from all child nodes of a parent
node. Sink calculates the total number of packets parent
must have forwarded by adding the packet count from each
child report. Sink compares the packet count found from
reports with the packet count Sink maintained during packet
processing by sink node module. If the difference in the packet
count is greater than the threshold, Sink compares the average
trust of the parent node. If the average trust is less than the
predefined threshold then parent node is marked as malicious
node.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The efficiency and effectiveness of PCAD are evaluated
in NS-3 simulator. We have compared proposed approach
with DSHA [6]. Simulation is done by deploying 100 nodes
randomly in a square area. Each node is installed with 802.15.4
MAC protocol and with channel delay of 2 milli seconds.
Simulation ran with generating 50 packets per node. Non leaf
nodes are randomly selected as malicious nodes. All nodes act
as a source node and generate the data to forward towards sink.
Obtained simulation results from the algorithm for various
number of malicious nodes.
A. Percentage of Detection
Simulated and found the detection rate when the number of
malicious nodes are 10, 20, 30, and 40.
% detection = (No. of malicious nodes detected / No. of
malicious nodes in network)*100
For each quantity of malicious nodes, traffic is generated
in 5 trails and averaged the detected malicious nodes in
5 trails. As shown in figure 7, percentage of detection is
improved in PCAD when compare to DSHA approach. In
DSHA, the percentage of detection deteriorates as the number
of malicious nodes increases. PCAD detects malicious node by
Sink considering the total packets transmitted and also reports
from each node instead of focusing on certain area of the
network as done in DSHA.
Fig. 7. Percentage of malicious node detection
B. Percentage of False Isolation
Simulated and analyzed the false detection when the number
of malicious nodes are 10, 20, 30, and 40.
% false detection = (No. of genuine nodes isolated / No. of
genuine nodes in network)*100
Fig. 8. Percentage of false isolation
As shown in figure 8, percentage of false detection is high in
DSHA approach. In PCAD approach, considered trust from all
children node to avoid bad mouth attack from a particular child
which tries to frame the parent as malicious by sending low
trust value to Sink. Sink detects the malicious nodes having
the complete state of the network data transmitted.
C. Early Detection Rate
Simulated and analyzed the early detection when the num-
ber of malicious nodes are 20 in the network. In both PCAD
and DSHA, traffic is generated in multiple rounds of equal
duration and tried to find the malicious nodes after each round.
DSHA needs long operation of the network to detect the
malicious nodes.
As shown in figure 9, PCAD detects the malicious nodes
early compare to DSHA, so that network cannot afford to
Fig. 9. Early Detection Rate
loose lot of meaningful information before all malicious nodes
are detected. Both Sink and child follows the same protocol
for parent selection. After each round of operation, Sink
determines the next possible parent node of the child among
the parents list of the child. And even the child follows the
same protocol[16] as Sink for parent selection for next round
of operation. PCAD detects early as it operates in rounds,
detects malicious after each round and child node can change
parent node after each round.
D. Bad Mouthing Attack Analysis
PCAD detects the malicious nodes with the support of
observation on parent and providing report of the packet
transfer count to Sink node. In bad mouthing attack, a node
gives false report on the neighbor node just to frame the
neighbor node as malicious. In PCAD, child node can try to
frame the parent node as malicious by adding the false packet
count in report sent to Sink. Sink declares the malicious node
only if the packet count difference is greater than threshold
and also average trust value is less than threshold. Average
trust value of a parent is calculated by averaging the trust
values sent by each child node of a parent node. Average trust
value is considered to avoid the bad mouthing attack from any
particular child node.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Power control and sinkhole are critical security attacks to
disrupt the data and operation in wireless sensor networks. Pro-
posed method is proven to be efficient to detect power control
and sinkhole attacks compare to DSHA approach. PCAD starts
with selection of parent for forwarding the data towards Sink.
PCAD observes the parent and expects acknowledgement from
2-hop node to detect sinkhole and power control attacks. Early
detection is possible as PCAD operation includes detection of
malicious nodes after a round of operation. It also provides
flexibility to change the parent node based on child node
experience with parent node. PCAD approach does not lose lot
of meaningful information as the node changes the parent after
each round of operation. Performance results show that PCAD
detect the malicious nodes early with high detection rate and
low false detection. Our future work includes providing a
integrated solution which detects packet dropping, modifying,
misrouting, using wrong identity along with power control and
sinkhole attacks.
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